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ABSTRACT	
Hailed initially as the country’s saviour for saving Italy from default, Mario Monti’s technocratic 
government (2011-13) ended in controversy and with its achievements questioned. Aware of this 
contested legacy, this article seeks to revisit Monti’s term in office and to assess his approach to the 
crisis that engulfed Italy and the eurozone in 2011-12. In doing so, it looks primarily at Monti’s 
European policy, but also briefly examines his domestic agenda. Monti’s legacy has so far drawn 
very limited academic interest. By filling a gap in the existing literature on contemporary European 
and Italian affairs, this article aims to improve our understanding of a critical phase in the recent 
politics and foreign policy of one the key EU member states.  
Keywords: Italy, euro crisis, euro, EU, Monti, eurozone  
Introduction1 
On 10 November 2011, as Italians awoke to the news that yields on Italy’s 10-year 
treasury bonds had risen to almost 7.5 percent — a level widely regarded by analysts 
as unsustainable in the long term — alarm and bewilderment spread through the 
country.2  Since the worsening of the euro crisis in 2011, Italians had repeatedly been 
told by Silvio Berlusconi’s centre-right coalition government that Italy was not Greece 
and that its financial position and economic fundamentals were much sounder than 
those of its Mediterranean neighbour3.. Now, suddenly and almost incomprehensibly, 
they were witnessing their country’s slide into financial turmoil4. To compound their 
distress and disorientation was an escalating political crisis in Rome. For weeks, 
pressure had been mounting — both within and without the country 5   — on 
Berlusconi to resign6. On 8 November, the embattled leader, whose numbers in 
																																																								
1 I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions. 
2 FT.com 2011d 
3 FT.com 2011a 
4 The eurozone’s sovereign debt crisis can be regarded as an aftershock of the 2007-08 global financial crisis. 
Although the underlying causes of the eurozone crisis lie in the monetary union’s unfinished structure and 
somewhat faulty economics (Marsh 2009, pp.1-18), the global financial crisis laid bare the euro’s fundamental 
weaknesses (Stiglitz 2016, pp.41) by tightening credit and imposing significant financial burdens on governments 
through bailout programmes and fiscal stimuli. For a brief analysis of the links between the two crises see, for 
instance, Soros (2012, pp.73-89), Stiglitz (2016, ch. 1) and Marsh (2009, pp.1-18). 
5 As the eurozone crisis took a turn for the worse in the late spring and early summer of 2011, investors’ 
confidence in Italy’s capacity to remain financially solvent quickly evaporated. To worry them was the Berlusconi 
government’s apparent inability to promote economic growth and stabilise Italy’s parlous public finances. On this 
point see Jones (2012, pp.83-100). 
6 FT 2011c. 
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Parliament had been haemorrhaging since 2010, had announced his intention to step 
down following the loss of his majority in the lower house7. With Italian bonds 
consumed by panic and with a political system seemingly incapable of dealing with 
the financial emergency, a Greek-style financial meltdown now looked a distinct 
possibility8. In one crucial aspect, however, Italy was certainly different from Greece 
— although this was by no means the way Berlusconi would have wished others to see 
it: as the eurozone’s third largest (and the world’s seven largest) economy, Italy had a 
much greater destabilizing potential than its tiny Mediterranean neighbour. As the 
Economist vividly put it in mid-November 2011, “[w]hen the world’s third largest 
bond market begins to buckle, catastrophe looms”9. At stake, of course, were not only 
the solvency of the Italian state and the survival of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) with its flagship, the euro. At risk were also the viability of the European 
Union (EU)’s single market and the health of the overall world economy. The mood of 
impending disaster was well captured in the alarmed, and often panicky, reporting by 
Italian and international media organisations. 
On 12 November 2011, Berlusconi finally tendered his resignation to President 
Giorgio Napolitano. Less than 24 hours later, Napolitano formally asked Mario 
Monti, a well-established economics professor at Milan’s prestigious Bocconi 
University and former European Commissioner for internal market and services 
(1995-99) and later competition (1999-2004), to form an emergency government10.  
The self-effacing, soft-spoken and professorial Monti could not have been more 
different in manners from the flamboyant, clownish and scandal-prone Berlusconi11. 
Unlike his controversial predecessor, the then 68-year-old Monti was held in high 
regard in EU and international circles12. Almost exclusively comprised of academics 
and top public servants, Monti’s new technocratic administration was sworn in on 16 
November 13 . Although he had attempted to include elected politicians in his 
ministerial team, the principal parties supporting his government — the centre-right 
Popolo della Libertá (the People of Freedom, PdL), the centre-left Partito 
Democratico (Democratic Party, PD) and the centrist alliance, the “Third Pole” — 
chose not to take up cabinet posts, preferring to maintain a low profile14. Monti’s 
mandate was far from being an open-ended one: like a modern Cincinnatus, the 
Roman aristocrat and statesman known for his integrity and selfless dedication to the 
Roman republic, Monti was supposed to remain in office only for the time strictly 
necessary to implement a raft of emergency measures aimed at restoring 
international confidence in Italy’s financial position. In any case, his government was 
not expected to last beyond the next general election, then due by April 2013. On 
Monti taking office, the Berlusconi-owned newspaper, Il Giornale, predicted that the 
technocratic government would fall as soon as its economic agenda was made 
public15. Uncertainty over the government’s long-term survival was also reinforced by 
Berlusconi’s warnings that he could bring Monti down at any time if the latter tried to 
implement measures unpopular with the PdL16. With no predetermined majority in 
																																																								
7 FT 2011b. 
8 Economist 2011b. 
9 Economist. 2011b. 
10 FT 2011d. 
11 FT.com 2011c. 
12 FT.com 2011d. 
13 FT.com 2011e. 
14 FT.com 2011e; Bosco and McDonnell 2013, p. 38. 
15 FT.com 2011f. 
16 FT.com 2011g. 
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parliament, Monti hoped to succeed where previous “political” administrations had 
failed — namely in reviving a sclerotic economy and in lowering Italy's massive public 
debt17. He had, no doubt, an unenviable task ahead.  
As events turned out, the “Monti experiment” was short-lived — he stepped down in 
December 2012 following the PdL’s decision to withdraw parliamentary support. In 
his brief tenure at Palazzo Chigi, however, Monti made significant strides in 
dampening widespread international fears over Italy’s ability to avoid default. His 
successors, Enrico Letta and Matteo Renzi, were able, notwithstanding the 
inconclusive February 2013 general election and Rome’s endlessly fractious political 
landscape, to gain some respite from market turbulence thanks to Monti’s 
consolidation programme. At least temporarily, a financial crisis had been averted in 
Italy even though the country’s public debt remained worryingly high, at about 127 
percent of GDP in 2012, and its economic revival appeared as elusive as ever18. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, during Italy’s 2013 election campaign — a campaign which 
saw Monti run as the leader of a newly formed political party, Scelta Civica per l’Italia 
(“Civic Choice for Italy”) — his alleged focus on austerity came under severe criticism 
from both sides of politics. Such criticism gained a significant traction in the 
domestic press and, to some extent, in the international media too. Memorable, in 
this respect, remains the harsh judgment passed on him by Wolfgang Münchau, the 
Financial Times’s influential columnist on European economic affairs. History, 
claimed Münchau, would accord Monti a “role similar to that played by Heinrich 
Brüning, Germany’s chancellor from 1930 to 1932”, whose deflationary policies are 
regarded by some as having unwittingly brought Hitler to power19. In the New York 
Times (2013), Paul Krugman, the authoritative American economist, was no less 
stinging. He dismissed Monti as a “proconsul installed by Germany to enforce fiscal 
austerity on an already ailing economy”20.  
Hailed at the start of its term in office as the government Italy needed to right its ship 
after Berlusconi's disastrous interlude, the Monti experiment ended in controversy 
and with its record in office fiercely contested. Aware of such a contested legacy, this 
article reassesses Monti's term in government and his approach to the crisis that 
engulfed both Italy and the eurozone between 2011 and 2012. It does so by focussing 
principally on Monti’s European policy. With the euro crisis being a continental 
rather than a purely Italian emergency, Monti was right to view it as one requiring 
primarily an EU-wide response. Accordingly, his policy was designed to ensure that 
Italy would play a significant role in shaping such response. That said, the article also 
briefly examines Monti’s domestic program for, as the following pages will make 
clear, the technocratic administration saw its domestic and European agendas as 
closely intertwined. Monti’s legacy has so far drawn limited scholarly interest, no 
doubt as a result of the still very recent nature of the events covered in this article. By 
filling this gap, the article aims to make a contribution to our understanding of a 
critical phase in the politics and foreign policy of one of the key EU member states. In 
order to achieve this, it relies primarily on the wealth of news reports and analyses 
that have been published since the beginning of the euro crisis.  
Monti’s uphill task 
																																																								
17 Lombardi and Paganetto 2014, p.66. 
18 Denk 2013, p.5. 
19 FT.com 2013b; for Bruning’s policies see Patch 1998, pp. 10-13. 
20 P. Krugman, 2013. 
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Monti came into office in the midst of one of Italy’s most severe political and 
economic crises since the Second World War 21 . On the domestic front, the 
technocratic government was staring at financial meltdown and facing an ailing 
economy that, for far too long, had suffered from anaemic growth and low 
productivity22. The gravity of Italy's economic situation was compounded by the 
political system's apparent inability to address the country's economic woes. The 
experience of the Berlusconi government (2008-2011) was indicative in this respect. 
With its credibility weakened by intra-coalition squabbles and by its leader's 
controversial lifestyle and ongoing tussle with the judiciary, the centre-right 
administration had looked increasingly adrift and unable to provide a coherent 
strategy to shield Italy from Greek contagion. More problematically, the growing 
disarray within the government ranks was accompanied by deep divisions among the 
centre-left opposition parties — divisions that made it difficult for them to form an 
alternative majority government23.  To make matters worse, the emergence of an 
anti-establishment party such as the Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five Star Movement, 
M5S) — underlining, as it did, the Italian public’s growing contempt for its political 
elites — bode ill for Italy’s governability and its ability to respond to the tough 
challenges ahead.  
On the international front, Monti faced an almost equally daunting challenge. Italy’s 
loss of international credibility during the Berlusconi years had been palpable. 
Berlusconi’s licentious lifestyle and pitiful gaffes had made him an almost 
embarrassing presence at EU summits. His government’s apparent inability to 
deliver on EU commitments had exasperated his European counterparts24. With the 
euro crisis entering its most dangerous hour in the autumn of 2011, the eurozone’s 
survival appeared to be increasingly pinned on Italy’s ability to stave off financial 
meltdown. Monti, therefore, was only too conscious of the pressing need to tackle 
Italy’s economic woes, reassure its international partners and restore the country’s 
credibility among financial investors. To better shape the government’s economic 
agenda, he initially reserved the finance portfolio (Ministry of the Economy) for 
himself25. In that capacity, he could also attend the Eurogroup and Ecofin meetings of 
EU finance ministers and, in so doing, be better placed to influence the Union’s 
response to the crisis. 26  From his standpoint, both the domestic and European 
dimensions were tightly interwoven. He had little doubt that Italy had to put its 
house in order, not just to avoid a disastrous default, but also to avert the eurozone’s 
implosion. In a series of blunt newspaper articles and speeches delivered before 
taking office, he had criticised Italy’s political elites for failing to tackle the nation’s 
debt and foster domestic growth27. Monti, however, had also been equally adamant 
that these objectives could only be secured trough reinforced EU (and international) 
collaboration.  
																																																								
21 Puri Purini 2011. 
22 Emmott 2012, pp. 64-65. 
23 Nor was the PD willing to form a government that would have to pursue an unpopular economic agenda. See 
Zulianello (2013: pp.247). 
24 FT 2011a. 
25 FT.com 2011g. 
26 The Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin) comprises the finance ministers of the 28 EU member 
states. The Ecofin can deliberate on any aspects of the EU’s economic governance bar monetary policy, which is 
traditionally an ECB prerogative. As for the Eurogroup, its membership is restricted to the finance ministers of the 
19 members of the eurozone. It generally meets the day before the Econfin and focuses on issues pertaining to the 
eurozone.  
27 FT.com 2011c. 
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The first opportunity for Monti to elaborate on these points came on 17 November 
2011 during his first address to the Italian Parliament. In speaking to senators before 
the confidence vote, he said that while Italy was no doubt facing a “serious 
emergency”, it was the whole European integration project that was experiencing its 
“most severe test since its inception”. No-one, he warned, should be under the 
illusion that such project “could survive a break-up of the EMU”. Such a break-up 
“would unravel the single market, its rules, its institutions, and would take us back to 
where we were in the 1950s”. For Monti, lack of proper governance was partly to 
blame for the eurozone’s woes, and this could only be “overcome by cooperation at 
European level”. Italy had a role to play here, but it could only do so if it ceased to be 
considered Europe’s “weak link”. Otherwise, he said, Italy would find itself “at the 
centre of a European project” that it had not conceived — a project, that is, “designed 
by countries that, while having the future of Europe at heart, have also at heart their 
national interests, among which a strong Italy may not necessarily feature”. Hence, 
the future of the euro would also “depend on what Italy does in the next few weeks”. 
“International investors”, he continued, “hold 50 percent of our public debt. We have 
to convince them that we have embarked on a gradual but lasting reduction of our 
debt-to-GDP ratio”. To achieve this, the government intended to rely on “three 
pillars” — “fiscal rigour, economic growth and social fairness”. Fiscal consolidation 
was necessary to meet Italy's economic emergency and lay the groundwork for lasting 
domestic growth. This, in turn, was also dependent on a series of reforms aimed at 
modernising Italy's economy, labour market and society. What is more, fiscal 
consolidation and economic growth would help bolster Italy's role in Europe. His 
government, therefore, did not view European demands as an “imposition”: 
economic reforms were not simply what the EU expected from Italy, but also what 
Italy should expect from itself. In casting himself as a strong supporter of European 
integration, he added emphatically that “there is no us and them. We are Europe”28.  
Following through on these ideas, on 4 December Monti introduced a supplementary 
budget centred on tax increases, spending cuts and the rationalisation of the state 
administration. Named “Save Italy”, the decree law included a package of severe 
fiscal adjustments worth roughly €30 billion (US$ 40 billion) aimed at balancing the 
budget by 2013. Predominantly focussed on fiscal consolidation (with more than 300 
billion of Italy’s €1.9 trillion debt expected to be refinanced in 2012, this was hardly 
surprising), the budget nonetheless included €10 billion worth of tax breaks designed 
to assist Italian firms in expanding their workforce, and other measures intended to 
promote infrastructure development29. The decree law (which would be passed by 
both houses of Parliament with large majorities in mid-December 2011) also included 
an ambitious overhaul of the pension system30. In December, Monti also indicated 
that the government would look to introduce significant structural reforms (including 
the controversial reform of the labour market) to promote long-term growth 31 , 
without which Italy could hardly improve its debt-to-GDP ratio32. 
																																																								
28 Repubblica 2011a. 
29 Culpepper 2014, 1271; Economist 2011e; Economist 2011c. 
30 Cencig 2012, 32; Economist Intelligence Unit 2012, p.12. 
31 Monti's labour-market reform included plans to make it easier for firms to fire permanent workers 
(by relaxing dismissal rules through a reform of Article 18 of the Workers’ Statute, which had 
traditionally made it tough for Italian companies employing more than 15 workers to make 
unproductive or underperforming staff redundant) and to provide increased job protection for 
temporary and young workers. In addition, Monti sought to liberalise (and thus increase competition 
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While intent on implementing its ambitious domestic economic agenda, Monti also 
embarked on a diplomatic offensive to shore up Italy's image and position in Europe. 
He had two chief tasks at hand — firstly, to reassure Italy’s EU partners of his 
reformist credentials and, secondly, to ensure that Rome would play a leading role in 
devising EU responses to the crisis. Neither task was easy. At the Eurogroup meeting 
on 28-29 November, Monti was handed a confidential report by the Commission 
warning that unless Italy overhauled its economy rapidly, it could be faced with 
serious liquidity problems. Luckily for him, the eurozone’s finance ministers were 
coming round to the view that only stronger action from the European Central Bank 
(ECB) could ward off a run on Italy’s sovereign debt33. Monti could not have agreed 
more. In his view, the solution to Italy’s financial woes — as he would never tire to 
repeat in the following months — did “not depend only on Italy’s efforts, but also, and 
essentially, on Europe’s ability to confront the crisis in a more decisive way”34. He 
was already on record for urging greater ECB market intervention in the short-term 
and the introduction of eurobonds in the long-term35. On 24 November, at a trilateral 
summit in Strasbourg with German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy, Monti, while re-emphasising his commitment to stabilise Italy’s 
debt burden, had also cautiously reiterated his support for eurobonds36.  
Little progress, however, was made in Strasbourg on this issue. While Sarkozy was 
happy for the ECB to intervene energetically on international bond markets in 
support of eurozone treasury bonds under speculative attack, he was still opposed to 
eurobonds. So was Merkel, who had already made her position clear ahead of the 
summit by describing a Commission proposal for the creation of commonly issued 
“stability bonds” as “troubling”37.  In the end, the three leaders agreed to refrain from 
pressurising the ECB. Where, however, they registered considerable agreement was 
on the need to strengthen budgetary discipline across the eurozone. Both Merkel and 
Monti favoured the creation of a "fiscal union" which would deepen EMU fiscal and 
economic integration. Sarkozy, too, favoured greater budgetary discipline but sought 
to link it with demands for a more prominent ECB role in buying up EU sovereign 
bonds. Germany rejected such a quid pro quo at least at this stage38. On issues 
regarding EMU economic governance, Berlin retained a de facto veto power. 
Greater fiscal discipline within the EU was not a novel issue in late 2011. In June 
2010 EU leaders had already agreed to consider means to strengthen the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP) but had fallen short of supporting automatic fines for states 
failing to abide by EU fiscal rules39. Whereas Germany, backed by a bunch of 
northern European countries, favoured automatic fines, France and Italy, together 
with Spain, Belgium and others, were opposed to them. This latter group did not 
reject greater fiscal discipline but wanted the new rules to allow for a degree of 
political discretion40. At a Franco-German summit in Deauville in October 2010, 
Merkel had, against her instincts, caved in to French pressure not to make sanctions 
																																																																																																																																																																													
in) areas such as the service sector, local public services, energy, banking and insurance. On this point 
see Cencig (2012, pp.39-46) and Culpepper (2014, pp.1273-1274). 
32 Economist Intelligence Unit 2012, p.13. 
33 FT.com 2011l. 
34 Economist online 2012a. 
35 FT.com 2011b. 
36 Sole 24 Ore 2011; Repubblica 2011b. 
37 FT.com 2011h; WSJ 2011. 
38 LE MONDE 2011; FT.com 2011j; FT.com 2011i. 
39 FT.com 2010a; Marsh 2011, p.202. 
40 FT.com 2010b. 
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automatic41. In late 2011, however, she was having second thoughts on this and began 
to push for tighter rules42. She was unconvinced that legislation put forward by the 
Commission and the President of the EU Council, Herman Van Rompuy, (the so-
called “six-pack” and “two pack”) 43 was stringent enough44. As for Sarkozy, he was 
now willing to accept less political discretion in the process leading to sanctions45.  
The new Franco-German understanding was sealed in Paris on 5 December 2012. In 
the French capital, the two leaders agreed on a joint proposal to be tabled at the 
forthcoming European summit. The plan included, among other things, automatic 
sanctions for those states in breach of the SGP’s 3 per cent rule on budget deficits; the 
introduction of a “golden rule” into the member states’ national constitutions, 
committing them to balance their budgets; an agreement to create a permanent bail-
out facility, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). These reforms should be 
preferably enshrined in a new EU treaty, but if agreement from all 27 EU members 
were impossible to achieve, France and Germany would be ready to settle for an 
intergovernmental agreement among the 17 eurozone members46. The European 
Council, held in Brussels on 8-9 December, witnessed British opposition to a new 
treaty, thus forcing EU leaders to compromise on an intergovernmental “fiscal 
compact”. The new agreement would introduce semi-automatic sanctions on the 
participating EU countries overshooting the deficit target of 3 per cent of their GDP; 
it would commit participating governments to ensure that debt and deficit ceilings be 
enshrined in national constitutions; it would also enable the European Court of 
Justice to control whether national legislation was adequately binding. Leaders also 
agreed to the establishment of a €500 billion large ESM47. 
Monti welcomed a bigger firewall and greater fiscal responsibility48. As mentioned 
earlier, he had little doubt that a stable eurozone required greater fiscal coordination 
and that such integration should be underpinned by stricter budgetary discipline. 
Without better economic governance, the single currency might indeed be at risk of 
collapsing. But he was also realistic enough to know that unless Berlin secured an 
agreement committing member states to fiscal discipline, it would remain firmly 
opposed to eurobonds as well as to an ECB role as a lender of last resort. In this, 
Monti was on the same wavelength as ECB President Mario Draghi. Only a few days 
earlier, Draghi had spoken of a "fiscal compact" both as a means of "restoring 
credibility" in the financial markets and a prerequisite for more effective ECB 
intervention. For Draghi, greater fiscal discipline had to come first. “Other elements”, 
he added, “might follow, but the sequencing matters”49. Indeed, that sequencing 
mattered for Monti too. Without greater fiscal responsibility, Germany would not 
give ground on the issue of eurobonds.  
																																																								
41 Pisani-Ferry 2014, p.110; Economist 2010. 
42 Pisani-Ferry 2014, pp.110-111; Economist 2011a. 
43 Put forward by Van Rompuy, the “six-pack” envisaged the introduction of early financial sanctions 
against states in breach of the SGP. Proposed by the Commission, the “two-pack” package required 
member states to provide the Commission each year with detailed information on their budget plans 
so that the Commission could comment on them and demand changes. 
44 Pisani-Ferry 2014, pp.110-111. 
45 Economist 2011d. 
46 FT.com 2011m; Economist 2011d. 
47 PISANI-FERRY 2014, P.112; FT.com 2011n and 2011o; Economist 2011f. 
48 IHT 2011; COMELLI 2012, P.54. 
49 FT 2011e. 
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With EU governments and institutions busy drafting the text of the agreement 
reached at the 8-9 December European summit, Monti focussed on other aspects of 
his programme. On 20 January, he announced a wide-ranging package of 
liberalisation measures50.  Although the government expected structural reforms to 
lift Italy’s long-term productivity and growth, these would take time to produce 
tangible results. In the interim, they were most likely to have a deflationary effect on 
the economy, thus making debt-reduction difficult in the short term51. Monti was 
clearly in need of some external help. As a result, he began to lobby for measures that 
would mitigate the short-term impact of his domestic reforms. What Monti had in 
mind were not only financial measures aimed at lowering Italy’s borrowing costs, but 
also EU-wide initiatives to boost domestic demand (and hence growth). As he well 
knew, Germany would hold the key to any progress in these areas. Hence, it was 
hardly surprising that Monti chose a visit to Berlin in early January 2012 to call for 
lower interest rates — a code word for eurobonds and greater ECB intervention in the 
bond markets52. In an interview with Die Welt, he warned that without greater EU 
efforts to lower Italy’s borrowing costs, his reformist agenda would be at risk. 
“[T]here would inevitably be”, he said, “a backlash in Italy against the EU, and also 
against Germany as the ringleader of EU intolerance and against the European 
Central Bank”53. With yields on Italian bonds remaining stubbornly high, Monti 
argued that such state of affairs could not just be ascribed to market concerns over 
Italy’s solvency, but was also attributable to the lack of credible EU mechanisms to 
reassure bond investors. He hoped that with the “fiscal compact” expected to be 
endorsed at the 30 January European Council, both Germany and the ECB could be 
more forthcoming towards mechanisms designed to assist states in financial 
difficulty54. That, however, was only one aspect of his message. He also urged the EU 
to relax its focus on austerity and endorse measures to stimulate growth across 
Europe55. Fiscal discipline, he said, was a “necessary” but not “sufficient” condition 
for growth56. In a visit to London in late January, he told British Prime Minister 
David Cameron that Italy was ready to support British efforts to complete the EU’s 
single market in areas such energy, services and the digital economy57. This, Monti 
hoped, would open up new opportunities. In February, Monti and Cameron signed a 
joint letter with other 10 EU leaders calling for the EU to adopt more growth-friendly 
measures, take vigorous action to complete its internal market and foster greater free 
trade internationally58.  
Monti’s advocacy for growth-creating measures was reflected in the conclusions of 
two European summits held in Brussels at the end of January and in early March 
2012. At the January European Council, EU leaders, while endorsing the fiscal 
compact, pledged to take measures to foster growth and combat unemployment59. At 
the March European Council — a summit that saw the signing of the fiscal compact — 
Monti, supported by Cameron and others, pushed for a more stringent EU 
monitoring of the member states’ performance in market liberalisation. This was 
																																																								
50 Economist 2012c. 
51 Economist 2012d. 
52 Economist 2012a; Repubblica 2012; FT 2012a. 
53 FT.com 2012a. 
54 FT.com 2012b and 2012c. 
55 FT 2012a. 
56 Economist 2012b. 
57 Economist 2012b; FT 2012b. 
58  DAILY TELEGRAPH 2012.  
59 IHT 2012; WSJ 2012a; FT.com 2014a. 
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reflected in the final communiqué calling for regular EU monitoring60. Although 
Monti was successful in somewhat shifting the EU debate towards a greater emphasis 
on growth, the eurozone’s focus remained very much set on austerity. In this context, 
however, he succeeded in blocking the introduction of tougher rules in the fiscal 
compact designed to speed up debt reduction for those countries (like Italy) with a 
public debt over 60 per cent of GDP61. All in all, despite the evident difficulty in 
overcoming German opposition to greater debt mutualisation, Monti had managed to 
achieve quite a significant turnaround in reputation for Italy. While Berlusconi had 
been shunned by his peers, Monti commanded respect and credibility. His grasp of 
the economic brief made him an authoritative voice among his EU peers. Italy was 
back at the top table, commented both the Economist and the Financial Times in 
January 201262. 
By the spring of 2012, the key aspects of Monti’s strategy were clearly discernible. The 
first and most important element was the government’s determination to push 
through far-reaching economic reforms and fiscal stabilisation. As mentioned earlier, 
his ambitious agenda was intended not only to save Italy from financial ruin and 
revive its anaemic economy, but also to prevent the EMU from disintegrating into 
chaos and acrimony. For Monti, Italy’s future prosperity was reliant on a viable EMU. 
Like other Italian leaders before him, he saw EMU membership as a way of “locking 
in” Italy to a long-term process of economic rebuilding and restructuring — the so-
called “external constraint” (vincolo esterno) or the idea that Italy needed some self-
imposed external discipline to modernise its economy and embrace a more virtuous 
fiscal behaviour63. The second aspect of Monti’s strategy was closely tied to this first 
one: his effort to regain international credibility was not an end to itself, rather a 
means to an end. From his viewpoint, restoring Italy’s reputation was essential not 
only to reassuring international investors about the country’s capacity to reform (and, 
hence, to lowering the costs of servicing its debt). It was also crucial to fulfilling 
traditional Italian foreign policy goals, such as the strengthening of European 
integration and the upholding of Italy's place in the inner circle of most powerful EU 
nations64. This, in turn, would enable Rome to have a say in the formulation of 
measures aimed at improving EMU governance and financial assistance. 
Furthermore, it would also spare Italy from taking on alone the burden of full 
adjustment. As the government sought to cut public debt and restructure the 
economy (at a time when the private sector was also cutting spending), Monti was 
painfully aware that EU-wide pro-growth measures were needed to avoid a sharp 
downturn and make fiscal consolidation attainable. Without growth, debt reduction 
would be illusory.  
The steep road ahead 
By the summer of 2012 Monti had succeeded in lifting Italy’s image and his reformist 
agenda had won him plaudits abroad. Yet for all the praise heaped on him by the 
international media, his popularity at home was in decline. 65  His government’s 
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parliamentary position appeared more vulnerable. In two rounds of local elections in 
May, the PdL, the largest party backing the government, saw its electoral support 
crumble. Its poor performance led some within the party to question its support to 
the government’s austerity programme. While not yet amounting to a no-confidence 
vote in Monti, these internal rumblings were nonetheless a sign that PdL was growing 
restless and might, at some point, pull the plug on the government66. As if this was 
not enough, the PdL’s electoral defeat, coupled with the PD’s rather lacklustre 
performance and the electoral growth of the populist M5S, also signalled the Italian 
public’s growing dissatisfaction with the country’s mainstream parties67. The May 
elections might have been only a warning shot, but, with Monti’s tough fiscal 
tightening beginning to bite and the economy sinking deeper into recession, the 
government was starting to face significant political headwinds68.  
Also alarming — at least from Monti’s standpoint — was the creeping opposition that 
its reformist agenda was encountering from the parties backing his government and 
pressure groups such as the trade unions69. The government’s labour-market reforms 
and its Cresci Italia (Grow Italy) liberalisation programme, which was designed to 
improve Italy's competitiveness by opening up closed-up sectors of its economy, had 
been watered down in Parliament70. To complicate things further, concerns over 
Italy’s overall fiscal position stubbornly refused to die down. After a brief respite, 
yields on Italy’s ten-year bonds had risen again to dangerous levels in late spring and 
early summer, thus putting both Italy’s economic recovery and its fiscal solvency at 
risk71. It was against this backdrop that Monti’s calls for a more effective approach to 
the euro crisis became more insistent over the summer72. In his advocacy, Monti 
found an important, if somewhat improbable, ally in France’s new socialist president, 
François Hollande. Hollande's Keynesian approach was not entirely in tune with 
Monti’s focus on balanced budgets and supply-side reforms. However, his calls for a 
renegotiation of the fiscal compact and the introduction of a “growth compact”, 
aimed at relaunching economic activity across the Union, were to help refocus the 
EU’s internal debate away from austerity and towards growth. What is more, his 
support for eurobonds promised to strengthen the hand of those EU nations 
demanding greater solidarity73. Hollande’s démarches represented a marked shift in 
France’s position. Under his predecessor, Paris had firmly aligned itself with Berlin 
even though France’s fiscal position should have made it more sympathetic to the 
problems of its Mediterranean partners74. Sarkozy’s reluctance to side with them was 
partly motivated by the belief that no French president could afford to call into 
question the Franco-German axis — one of the most enduring axioms of post-war 
French foreign policy. To some extent, however, it was also driven by concerns that 
closer identification with the Mediterranean “peripherals” would damage Paris’s 
international prestige and influence.  
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While unlikely to sacrifice traditional Franco-German ties on the altar of 
Mediterranean solidarity, Hollande was not averse to playing hardball with 
Germany75. By the summer of 2012, he had shown increasing inclination to disagree 
publicly with Germany and had also managed to secure broad Italian and Spanish 
support for his pro-growth agenda as well as his proposals for a financial stability 
package designed to strengthen the EU banking system76. On 14 June, Monti and 
Hollande agreed in Rome on a common position to shore up the EMU through 
growth-enhancing measures, debt mutualisation and a more effective firewall77. That 
both leaders were singing from a similar song sheet became increasingly evident a 
few days later at the G-20 in Los Cabos, Mexico (18-19 June) and, again, in Rome 
during a quadrilateral meeting between Germany, France, Italy and Spain (on 22 
June)78.  At Los Cabos, with Merkel under increasing international pressure to do 
more to solve the euro crisis, Hollande openly backed a Monti plan to use EMU 
bailout funds to buy in the open market the treasury bonds of “virtuous countries” 
(i.e. countries that were undertaking significant structural reforms) facing market 
pressure. According to the Italian plan, bailout funds would be automatically 
activated without their recipients having to submit to further budget cuts or further 
reforms79. In Rome, Monti and Hollande, now backed by Spanish Prime Minister 
Mariano Rajoy, returned to the charge and put Merkel under further pressure to 
agree to the Italian plan. Initially, the Chancellor refused to budge. All she was 
prepared to accept was a €130 billion package of measures designed to stimulate 
growth80. Eventually, however, Italian, French and Spanish endeavours met with 
success at the 28-29 June European Council meeting in Brussels. In addition to 
backing those growth-enhancing measures, the summit also endorsed Monti’s 
proposal on bailout fund assistance81.  
Generally interpreted as a diplomatic success for Monti, the June EU summit was 
also his political swansong. On the European scene, progress on the implementation 
of decisions taken at the summit was slow, with Germany already questioning some 
of them82. On the internal scene, the ever-shifting sands of Italian politics were 
testing Monti's political endurance and skills. As Italy's financial situation markedly 
improved in late 2012 following the ECB's decision to buy eurozone sovereign bonds 
in large quantities — Draghi’s pledge to “do whatever it takes to save the euro” had a 
remarkably calming effect on the international bond market, thus making possible a 
significant reduction in Italian bond yields — Monti’s domestic position weakened83. 
																																																								
75 FT.com 2012l and 2012q. 
76 FT.com 2012k, 2012j and 2012h. 
77 FT.com 2012m; WSJ. 2012b. 
78 Alas, Monti’s efforts to make common front with France and Spain in order to shift the EU’s internal debate 
from austerity to growth-enhancing measures failed to make much of an impression on domestic public opinion. 
The reason for this was, at least, threefold: first, the government’s attempts at coalition-building in Europe were 
either largely overlooked or simply discounted by the Italian public as unlikely to generate any immediate and 
tangible benefit; second, as Monti’s reforms began inevitably to bite and the road to economic recovery appeared a 
long and tortuous one, Italians became increasingly impatient with the government and its economic policies; 
third, Italian political parties such as the PD and PdL, while willing to let the technocratic government do the 
‘dirty work’ for them and push through long overdue (and painful) reforms, were also jockeying for influence 
amongst the electorate and preparing for the 2013 national election. They had an obvious interest in shifting all 
the blame on the ‘technocrats’. As for a party, such as the Northern League, which, after the 2007-08 global 
financial crisis, had lent support to the Berlusconi government’s fiscally conservative budgetary policy, it was now 
happy to ride popular discontent and cash on it. 
79 FT.com 2012n and 2014b; WSJ 2012d. 
80 FT.com 2012o. 
81 FT.com 2012p. 
82 FT.com 2012r. 
83 Economist 2012j. 
ANZJES 8(2) 
 
 
91 
With a forthcoming general election, Italian political parties began to jockey for 
influence. Berlusconi’s decision to make a political comeback and lead the PdL into 
the next general election destabilised the precarious equilibrium upon which Monti’s 
political survival rested. With the PdL lagging in the polls at about 15 percent, 
Berlusconi thought it was time to distance his party from Monti84. On 6 December, 
Berlusconi openly attacked his economic agenda and withdrew support to the 
government on two key reform bills85. In doing so, Berlusconi did not intend to bring 
down Monti just yet. Rather, his strategy was to keep a weakened government in 
power through a policy of parliamentary abstention until he had had time to 
reorganise the PdL ahead of the next spring’s general election. In the meantime, he 
would have been at liberty to attack the government’s economic record while casting 
himself as the only credible alternative to austerity86. Berlusconi’s manoeuvrings, 
however, did not go according to the script. While theoretically able to survive in 
Parliament without the PdL’s full support, Monti resigned on 8 December87. He had 
no intention of playing Berlusconi’s sacrificial lamb and being endlessly exposed to 
his parliamentary ambushes. Nor was Monti confident that he could entirely count on 
the PD’s continuing support despite his leader Pier Luigi Bersani’s strong 
protestations of loyalty. With the PD now polling above 30 percent, not only was 
Bersani likely to find the prospect of a snap election tempting, but he also had little 
interest in being seen as Monti’s key supporter88. In any case, since its formation, the 
Monti government’s non-partisan character and its political legitimacy had been 
premised on the combined and continuing support of Italy’s two major parties. 
Without it, the technocratic experiment was well and truly over. Despite Monti 
carrying on in a caretaker capacity until well after the February general election, his 
reformist agenda was cut short. Italy was again entering a new phase of political 
instability. The country’s capacity to reform itself and remain an effective actor on the 
EU scene was again called into question.  
Conclusion 
With Monti’s unexpected decision to enter politics in late December 2012, his record 
in office came under intense scrutiny in the lead-up to the February 2013 election, 
and, sadly for him, it did not survive unscathed. Praised initially for rescuing Italy 
from the brink of a disastrous default, the once “Super Mario” (as the international 
press liked to nickname him) was now taking the blame for his country’s longest and 
deepening post-war recession 89 . Quite predictably, those parties that had once 
supported his economic agenda were now openly critical of it. Media commentators 
who had been broadly sympathetic to his policies were now heaping criticism on him. 
Such criticism predictably centred on three areas: Monti’s over-reliance on fiscal 
consolidation and austerity measures, his unwillingness to defy Berlin’s pro-austerity 
“gospel” and his inability to kick-start Italy’s ailing economy. 
As this article has suggested, this criticism was largely undeserved. Despite 
experiencing difficulties in pushing its legislative program through Parliament, the 
government could nonetheless count several important pieces of legislation among its 
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achievements90. In any case, it was not for lack of trying that its reformist agenda was 
not fully implemented. Where powerful vested interest opposed reforms, the political 
parties backing Monti ensured that legislation would be watered down so to minimise 
its impact on their political constituencies. In this regard, their criticism that Monti 
had failed to spur growth because of his overwhelming focus on fiscal consolidation 
rather than on growth-enhancing measures, was disingenuous. Besides, while 
Monti’s fiscal consolidation no doubt produced short-term deflationary effects on the 
economy, the causes of Italy’s severe downturn could not be solely ascribed to the 
“technocrats”. To a good extent, they lay in Italy’s long-standing inability to lift 
domestic competitiveness and in the widespread fiscal contraction that had occurred 
in Europe following the 2007-08 global financial crisis 91 . In any event, with 
international investors terrified at the prospect of Italy defaulting on its enormous 
debt and no longer willing to cut Italy any slack unless its financial position improved 
markedly, the Monti government had little option than to give priority to fiscal 
consolidation. In recalling the dramatic circumstances that brought him to Palazzo 
Chigi in November 2011, Monti graphically remarked in January 2013 that he felt as 
though he was about “to jump on to a derailed train that was heading for the 
precipice”92. To his credit, the train has not derailed yet. 
But Monti’s room for manoeuvre was also significantly constrained in other 
important ways. As this article shows, for all his personal prestige, Monti could not 
ignore the widespread scepticism surrounding Italy’s ability to tackle its economic 
woes. He had the unenviable task of reassuring his European (and non-European) 
counterparts that Italy would neither be the eurozone’s weak link nor the country 
responsible for the single currency’s collapse. On the international stage, therefore, 
Monti’s key priority was to restore Italy’s credibility: by doing so, he hoped to allay 
concerns over Italy’s financial position and better protect Italian interests in Europe. 
To achieve this, he believed, correctly, that his government’s internal and external 
policies needed to be carefully synchronised. At a crucial juncture in the history of the 
European integration process, Italy, as one of the EU's founding members, could not 
afford to be sidelined in the EMU economic decision-making process. After all, 
Italian interests were not entirely coincidental with those of its main European 
partners, France and Germany. If, for instance, Rome supported Berlin's view that a 
viable eurozone could only be accomplished through deeper fiscal harmonisation and 
economic integration, it also shared Paris's desire to achieve greater debt 
mutualisation and (after Hollande's election) to see greater EU emphasis being 
placed on growth-enhancing measures. 
How successful was Monti in securing those Italian interests in Europe? In an EU 
context where give and take are at the very heart of the decision-making process, 
success could only be partial. This was all the truer given Germany’s growing political 
and economic ascendancy within the EU — an ascendancy that constrained Italy’s 
options even further. Italy, of course, was not alone in this position: France and other 
EU members were also confronted with Germany’s overwhelming influence. As the 
seemingly indispensable EU power and EMU anchor, Berlin could effectively scupper 
any initiative contrary to its interests. For Monti, therefore, challenging German 
prescriptions head-on was neither smart politics nor sound policy. It was not smart 
politics because no lasting solution to the euro crisis could be found without German 
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blessing. Nor was it sound policy because by openly rejecting the fiscal discipline 
advocated by Berlin, Italy would harm its economic interests. The idea, for instance, 
that Italy should have stood up to Germany and made its EMU membership 
conditional upon the achievement of greater solidarity between EMU creditor and 
debtor nations ran counter to Italy’s long-standing support for European 
integration 93 . It would also have been tantamount to exercising a devastating 
“nuclear option” — an option, that is, likely to lead to EMU implosion and economic 
chaos in Italy. For Monti, the only practical option was to encourage Germany to 
commit gradually to greater debt mutualisation and show greater flexibility in 
interpreting the fiscal rules governing the eurozone. In this, Monti’s hopes were not 
misplaced. If only tentatively and often reluctantly, Germany gradually accepted 
greater ECB market intervention, committed to the idea of a banking union and 
agreed to some measure to spur EU growth. To his credit, Monti played not an 
insignificant role in prodding Germany along this path. Pity was that his good work 
was cut short by the dynamics of Italy’s dysfunctional politics. 
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